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PRESIDENTIAL ADVICE AND INFORMATION:
POLICY AND PROGRAM FORMULATION
NORMAN C. THoMAs*
The "Hickel letter" incident of May, 1970, occurring in the context of the move-
ment of American forces into Cambodia and the campus crises that precipitated and
followed the killing of four Kent State University students by National Guard troops,
raised in dramatic fashion the questions that are asked about every national admin-
istration in time of trouble. "Who sees the President?" "To whom does he listen?"
"Is the President isolated?" "What are his sources and means of obtaining informa-
tion?" Although not nearly so widely publicized, similar and related questions
concerned the members of two subcommittees of the House of Representatives as they
conducted hearings in the Spring of I97O on presidential advisory committees and on
President Nixon's proposed Reorganization Plan No. 2 of i97o, to restructure sig-
nificantly the Executive Office of the President.1 These concerns reflect the general
recognition among observers of and participants in high level national politics that
responsive presidential policy leadership is as dependent upon the formal and in-
formal processes whereby the President obtains advice and information as it is upon
his personal characteristics such as political style and tactics. Academicians have
understood the institutional as well as the personal dimension of presidential leader-
ship for some time,2 but it often tends to be overlooked by sophisticated observers
and is not recognized by the public. Undoubtedly, this condition exists because of
the extent to which the mass media have personalized politics and, more importantly,
because personal traits and characteristics have always offered simpler and more
visible explanations of presidential behavior. It is easier for the analyst to develop
and for the public to understand explanations that focus on the individual who
occupies the White House than it is to wrestle with the complex questions of where
ideas come from and how they are translated into policies that lead to operating
programs of action.
*Professor of Political Science, Duke University; Author, CONGRESS: POLITICS AND PRACTICE (x964);
RULE 9: PoLrics, ADamsTATIoN, AND Civit RIGHTS (1966).
'Hearings on Presidential Advisory Committees Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov-
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In this paper I will examine the formal and informal advisory and informational
devices that modern Presidents employ in the formulation of policies and programs.
My primary concern is with information inputs to presidential decision-making
processes and with the conversion of those inputs to policy choices. The questions
that will guide the analysis include: (i) What are the President's major sources of
information and advice? (2) What kinds of people tend to become presidential
advisors? (3) What are the limitations of the various advisory mechanisms? (4)
What are the advantages of the different mechanisms? (5) What kinds of relation-
ships exist between the President and his advisory system? (6) What are the char-
acteristics of a viable advisory system? (7) What trends and developments are
emerging in the patterns of advising, informing, and assisting the President with
respect to his policy-making responsibilities?
I
PpxsiDENAL COUNSELLiNG: AN OVERVIEW
A. Staffing the Presidency
Since the late 193o's, Presidents, their principal assistants, and students of the
presidency have regarded as axiomatic the presidential dependence on advice and
information and the need for assistance in securing and utilizing them. The Brown-
low Committee Report of 1937, the Reorganization Act of 1939 which established the
Executive Office of the President, the Employment Act of 1946 which created the
Council of Economic Advisers, the reports of the two Hoover Commissions in
1949 and 1955, the development of an elaborate formal staff under President Eisen-
however, the use of informal and ad hoc study groups, task forces, and committees
by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and, most recently, President Nixon's creation
of the Domestic Council are manifestations of the continuing effort to respond to
the presidential need for assistance. That effort is often referred to in governmental
circles as "staffing" while academically it has been encompassed within the broader
and more ambiguous term "institutionalization."
According to William D. Carey, a former Assistant Director of the Budget who
spent 25 years with the Bureau of the Budget, staffing should assist the President with
respect to policy analysis, communications, outreach, and command and controlY
In the process of policy and program formulation as distinguished from implementa-
tion,0 policy analysis, communication, and outreach are of more direct importance than
'Thomas E. Cronin, in his contribution to this symposium, explores the exchange system that the
President relies upon for the implementation and monitoring of programs.
r Carey, Presidential Staffing in the Sixties and Seventies, 29 Ptm. A. REv. 450 (1969).
'The distinction between formulation and implementation made in this symposium is one of con-
venience rather than theoretical conviction. It is not my intention to reinstitute the ancient politics-
administration dichotomy. There is quite obviously a continual overlapping of formulative and imple-
menting actions in all policy areas as events move in parallel as well as in series with continual feedback
from prior actions affecting future decisions. But there does exist a temporal sequence in presidential
policy leadership and I have chosen to recognize it in order to deal more extensively with the subject and,
LAw AND CoNTEoMAY PROBLEMS
the operational problems of command and control that lie at the center of policy
implementation. Staffing for policy and program formulation has varied from the
Roosevelt to the Nixon Administrations along a continuum of structural formality
ranging from the elaborate staff arrangements favored by President Eisenhower to
the free-wheeling administrative chaos that characterized the early years of the New
Deal under President Roosevelt. The determination of an administration's position
on that continuum is a matter of subjective judgment that rests on several factors:
the President's desire to innovate; the frequency and duration of policy crises; the
necessity and desire for secrecy in presidential decision-making; the President's
leadership style; the President's personal relations with his immediate staff, his prin-
cipal subordinates, and congressional leaders; the President's administrative orienta-
tion-his preference for systematized or random procedures, written memoranda
or oral briefs, etc.; and the President's priority ranking among the great quantity
of matters pressing on him for attention.
While I have not attempted to operationalize these factors so as to permit a
quantitative measurement of recent presidential administrations, I will explore
qualitatively their possible relationships with the degree of structural formality that
might be anticipated in the presidency. It seems quite apparent that a President
seeking to develop new policy departures will tend to prefer flexible staffing arrange-
ments. This was the case with Presidents Roosevel Kennedy, and Johnson, all of
whom were innovation-minded, but not with Eisenhower or Nixon, who both tended
to favor improvement and refinement (some might say consolidation) of existing
policies and programsY The President who seeks to change policies more than in-
crementally finds it helpful and necessary to obtain a steady flow of ideas, sug-
gestions, and information from a wide range of sources outside as well as within
the government His emphasis is likely to be more on the scope and variety rather
than the precision and detail of his policy intelligence. He is more apt to run the
risk that his decisions may be based on less than a comprehensive analysis of the
situation than to risk missing a promising new proposal that could lead to a break-
through. However, the costs of the structural flexibility required by an innovative
President can be substantial in terms of the lack of coordinated effort and the
erosion of policy control. Activist Presidents have tolerated chaotic advisory
secondly, to distinguish more clearly between the types of advice and information sought, the sources of
such knowledge, and the uses made of it in the principal stages of the presidential policy process.
ISee R. NusTADT, PaRsmEmN'AL Powaa. (196o); A. ScmLImNGEn, JR., THE COMING os THE N,,w
DEAL chs. 32-33 (x959); K. C.AEX & L. LEGERE, Tn PRESIENT AND n1E MANAGEMENT or NATIONAL
SacusurY (1969); Neustadt, Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK, 57 AMi. POL.
SMr. REv. 855 (1963).
'I am aware of the innovativeness of the Family Assistance Program that President Nixon proposed
in 1969. The major domestic policy orientation of the Nixon Administration is not activist, however. At
most it can be characterized as mildly reformist or restorative.
' For a discussion of President Johnson's efforts to expand the sources of policy proposals beyond
the traditional devices of agency submissions and clientele group suggestions see Leuchtenberg, The Genesis
of the Great Society, Tim REoRER, April 2x, x966, at 36-39; Thomas & Wolman, The Presidency and
Policy Formulation: The Task Force Device, 29 PuB. AD. Rev. 459 (1969).
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processes and have often received sloppy if not shoddy advice? ° Policy crises can also
affect staffing arrangements. A low incidence and short duration of crises tends to
favor the growth of formalized staffing. As long as information can be obtained and
processed routinely, formal arrangements can serve the President quite effectively.
Crisis conditions, however, have a way of forcing the development of special tempo-
rary devices to deal with the particular situation.' Information is needed quickly;
there is no time for carefully prepared analyses embodied in position papers. Persons
not normally in the formal policy-making structure may be needed for advice and
consultation. The pace of events is so rapid that decisions must be reached without
the usual process of checking and approval. These and similar considerations lead
to flexible staffing arrangements. Of course, recurrent crises are now a fach of our
national political life,--"emergencies in policy with politics as usual," Neustadt wrote
over ten years ago'--and to a degree they can be handled through predetermined
routines. But to the extent that each crisis presents a unique threat to the nation and
to the President it will call forth a special set of arrangements to deal with it. The
more crises that arise, the more the President will require flexible devices to meet
them.
Staffing arrangements are also a product of presidential personality and tempera-
ment. A President who has a penchant for secrecy and surprise, like Johnson or
Roosevelt, finds flexible arrangements much more suitable than formal ones. Also,
some Presidents-e.g., Roosevelt and Kennedy-are more free wheeling and less
bureaucratically oriented than others in their approach to administrative tasks.
Finally, to the extent that national security policy matters intrude upon domestic
politics formal staffing arrangements tend to be favored over informal. The handling
of national security policy lends itself more readily to systematic intelligence gathering
and evaluation and to structured decision-making than do domestic affairs. The
opportunity for internal maneuvering and bargaining is greatly reduced in situations
affecting national security. The need for consensus behind the President's course
of action is a powerful stimulus to close ranks. This facilitates formalization. In
addition, the sheer volume of information that must be processed in the national
security policy realm requires a considerable amount of systematization. Also,
since most Presidents find they must devote the bulk of their time and attention
to national security policy, and some prefer to do so anyway, there are strong pressures
toward formalized staffing.
It should be apparent, however, that not all of these factors work with the
10 Cf. D. MoYNmAN, MAXImum FEASIBLE M sUNDE=RSTANDING (1969).
"'The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is an excellent case in point President Kennedy dealt with the
extremely grave challenge through the vehicle of a temporary "executive committee" consisting of key
Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, top-ranking military officers, and members of his staff. He did not
reinstitute this body for any subsequent crisis. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS chs. 30, 3X
(1965); T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY ch. 24 (z965); E. Ar.L, Tim MISSILE CRssS (1966); Allison, Conceptual
Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 63 Am. POL. Sci. Rlv. 689 (1969).
'12 R. NEUSrADT, supra note 7, at i91 (ig6o).
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same intensity, and that they may work against each other in any given presidency.
For example, Kennedy's strong foreign policy orientation, a formalizing influence,
was apparently overcome by the steady flow of crises and by anti-formal personal
preferences and traits. Thus, it is difficult to estimate precisely the degree of struc-
tural formality in recent administrations. It is possible on the basis of scholarly studies,
however, to locate them in a rough ordering that gives some idea of relative
formalization. '
FIGURE ,
FO~mALizATIoN oF STAFFING ARANGEMENTS IN MODERN
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS
Roosevelt Kennedy Johnson Truman Nixon Eisenhower
Highly Mixed Highly
Informal Formal
The intervals between the Administrations are proximate and some may quarrel
with the position of the Johnson and Truman Administrations near the middle of
the scale. Yet it can be said with some confidence that the Roosevelt and Eisen-
hower Administrations mark the opposite extremities of the continuum, that the
Kennedy and Nixon Administrations are next in the degree of staffing informality
and formality respectively, and that the Johnson and Truman Administrations do
fall in the midsection with the former tending toward somewhat more informality.
The consequences of the level of staffing formalization are mixed. Both highly
formal and extremely informal arrangements have accompanying costs and benefits
for the President who adopts them. 4 The principal advantage claimed for formally
structured policy formulation lies in the comprehensive codification of decisions which
results in increased presidential control of the bureaucracy and provides a basis for
common understanding of policy goals and programs. It is also argued that a formal
approach results in the more systematic, careful decisional processes that are essential
to the management of large bureaucracies. The primary costs of formalization are
asserted to be the loss of flexibility of action, premature closure of policy options,
and the ultimate triumph of technique over purpose. It should be emphasized that
no President will adopt a completely formal or informal approach to staffing. There
is a considerable built-in tendency to formalization in the structures and routines
of the component elements of the Executive Office, e.g., the budgetary process, that
"sSee the previously cited works of Neustadt, supra note 7, Clark & Legere, supra note 7, Thomas
& Wolman, supra note 9; Neustadt's important articles on central clearance and presidential program
planning, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. POL. Scr. Rnv. 641
(1954), and Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program, 49 Am. PoL. Sci. Rrv. 980
(1955); Semple, Nixon z: Major Reshuffle at White House, New York Times, June 14, 1970, § 4, at x,
col. I; Reorganization Plan No. 2, supra note I.1
'This discussion follows K. CLAwx & L. LEGERE, supra note 7, at 25-28, 217-x8.
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cannot be abandoned for both practical and legal reasons. Likewise, there is such
a continual flow of crises and new problems that no amount of systematic con-
tingency planning or routinization can obviate the necessity for at least occasional
resort to ad hoc policy guidance. But within fairly broad parameters a President
may secure advice and information in a variety of ways. As noted above, much
depends on the President's interests and style, but since it is not possible to measure
let alone predict those qualities with any degree of confidence, I will focus the
analysis that follows on the control of staffing for policy formulation through struc-
tural forms and institutionalized procedures.
B. Information and Advisers in the Government Context
Advising Presidents is complicated by the nature of the information process
in government. That process has been characterized as "institutionalized self-
deception."' 5 This condition arises from two factors: the hierarchical structure of
bureaucracy and the adversary nature of American politics. The men in the higher
echelons require information-facts and arguments--to defend themselves against
attack. Their subordinates and their staffs undertake to provide it to them. In order
to serve their chiefs and to protect themselves, advisers and information sources inside
the government tend to make their presentations in the most favorable light possible.
The result is that "a kind of propitiatory optimism creeps into government re-
ports""0 and "what is taken to be true, therefore, is what it is politically desirable
to believe."'17 It is incumbent on top officials, Frankel concludes, to recognize this
flaw in governmental communications and to develop corrective instruments that
will introduce a measure of skepticism to the decision-making process sufficient to
insure more balanced judgments. One of the most effective and widely utilized
correctives is seeking advice from outsiders, particularly from the so-called "experts."
This practice also has its limitations, however.
Outside advisers, especially intellectuals and/or technical experts, encounter sub-
stantial difficulties in attempting to challenge the criteria that are the basis of existing
policies. True, they bring to their task prestige, extensive information, intensive
experience, and perspectives grounded more in theory and first principles than
pragmatic compromises with perceived reality. But these assets are fragile and are
accompanied by liabilities. Laski has warned that in the political realm, expertise
runs the danger of sacrificing "the insight of common sense to the intensity of experi-
ence."1 Since experts often lack humility and broad perspective, Laski argues that
they can only make a valuable contribution to government if they can manage to
1 5C. FwRNx., HImH ON FoGGy Boi-rom 8o (1969). Frankel, a distinguished philosopher, served from
July x965, until December 1967, as Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs. This discussion
draws upon his incisive account of his bureaucratic experience.
"' Id. at 83.17 d. at 88.
"sLaski, The Limitations of the Expert, in THE IrLauEaruAzs 167 (G. De Huszer ed. rg6o).
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relate their judgments to the values and aspirations of the public. Also, experts should
take care not to oversell their advice. This is perhaps particularly applicable to
social scientists whose theories and understanding of human behavior are limited-
in spite of extensive information and sophisticated research. Yet, in an effort not
to appear incompetent when asked for advice, they will often make recommendations
that are either unrealistic or politically infeasible when the wiser course of action
would be merely to suggest what common sense dictates. Kissinger, in a perceptive
discussion, 9 asserts that the central problem that the intellectual faces when called
upon for advice is that his contribution is invoked and utilized in terms of bureau-
cratically determined criteria. He thus finds that he may be providing information
that becomes the basis for endorsing and legitimizing existing policies rather than
serving as the basis for judgment regarding the efficacy of those and alternative
policies. In addition, the intellectual must be careful not to formulate his contribu-
tion so abstractly as to destroy its value to the political leaders who requested it. The
challenge to the intellectual whose expertise is invoked is, therefore, to reconcile "two
loyalties: to the organization that employs him and to values which transcend the
bureaucratic framework and provide his basic motivation."'2 Most of all, the in-
tellectual who serves the government must retain his independence and his dis-
interestedness. It is no easy task to accomplish, but the effort must be made as long
as the advice of intellectuals and experts is essential to effective leadership in policy
formulation.
The information process in government is also complicated in its efforts to in-
corporate expertise effectively by the extensive reliance placed upon committees as
vehicles for coordinating advice, synthesizing information, and framing proposals.
Kissinger states that reliance on committees arises from the lack of substantive
competence by high-level political executives.' As policy is identified with committee
consensus it loses any sense of direction and becomes a matter of adjustmenb to the
lowest common denominator. Committees, asserts Kissinger, emphasize conversation
and fluency rather than reflectiveness and creativeness. They tend to suppress dis.
agreement in the quest for consensus which most often favors the familiarity of the
status quo. In their normal functioning, committees, whether they are composed of
government officials or outside experts, are subject to substantial weaknesses. They
cannot provide top leaders with the sense of purpose that will enable those officials
to make effective use of the committee system. So far it has not been possible to de-
velop a presidential advisory and information system that overcomes the limitations of
governmental information processes, including the defects of committees. This
analysis of presidential staffing devices will consider their potential for resolving
such problems.
19 H. KiSSINGER, Tim NEcEssITY FoR CHOICE ch. 8 (196o).
2
0 Id. at 353.
" Id. at 343. See his discussion of committees and their defects, id. at 344-47.
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TilE VARIous ADVISORY MECHANISMS
The President obtains advice and information from the presidency itself, the
executive branch, Congress, and the public. The utilization and evaluation of this
"intelligence" is accomplished through four principal mechanisms: the Cabinet and
its appurtenant committees, the Office of Management and Budget, the White House
staff, and a variety of presidential advisory groups including task forces, councils,
commissions, conferences, and committees 2 These advisory devices are not arrayed
in a neat series of concentric institutional rings around the President. There is often
overlap between the channels of the devices so that information flows from one to
the other or it may be simultaneously processed by two or more of them. The
utilization of specific advisory mechanisms is in par. a function of their proximity
to the President, but it is also determined by his relationships with individual
advisers and their access to him. Although this analysis of advisory mechanisms has
an institutional focus, it is undertaken with a recognition of the importance of
individual interaction between the President and his advisers.
A. The Cabinet
The advent of a new national administration is always heralded by extensive
speculation concerning the composition of the Cabinet. This speculation usually
centers on leading members of the President's party, but it takes into consideration
certain criteria of appointment designed to give the Cabinet a broadly representative
character. For example, the Secretary of the Interior is traditionally a Westerner,
Agriculture goes to a farm state figure, the Attorney General must be a lawyer,
and Commerce and Treasury are usually filled by men from the business community.
Not infrequently the President-elect has announced his determination to utilize the
collective talents of his Cabinet, which of course will include "the best men the
nation has to offer," in the conduct of his administration. The Cabinet, it is promised,
will become a meaningful instrument of leadership and not a ceremonial organ
with little functional value. By implication the previous administration failed to
utilize the Cabinet's great potential as an advisory council for high-level policy
formulation. With equally predictable frequency, the new President finds after no
more than a few months in office that the Cabinet is hardly a suitable vehicle for
collective decision-making. Its value, as a collectivity, is more symbolic than opera-
tional; as an institutional embodiment of the representational scope of the admin-
istration rather than an instrument of collective choice.
The problem that Presidents encounter when they attempt to utilize the Cabinet
is that it is a far more suitable means of consolidating and extending political
strength than of advising with respect to policy development. It is an aggregation
" This typology of advisory mechanisms follows that suggested by Cronin & Greenberg, supra note 2,
at XvU-XViU.
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of highest level presidential advisers, but not a viable high-level advisory group.
This condition is a consequence and reflection of the "pluralistic conditions of
departmental growth and of Cabinet appointment."23 Cabinet departments developed
over time to perform a variety of functions in response to the felt needs of many
divergent groups. This pattern of growth encouraged the departments to act more
or less independently of each other. The selection of Cabinet members on the basis
of geographic and clientele interests encourages in Cabinet members a particularistic
loyalty to their subordinates and to their clientele groups that competes with
loyalty to the President This conflict of loyalties works against the formation of
any informal sense of mutual responsibility. But without a "sense of corporate unity
and common purpose,"24 the Cabinet's potential as an advisory body cannot be
realized.
The President can, and frequently does attempt to build support through in-
dividual Cabinet members and their departments. But even this use of the Cabinet
is limited by the conflict of loyalties. To the extent that Presidents choose Cabinet
members who will be unbending in their fealty to him, they risk weakening the
supportive potential of the appointments. The departmental pressures that impinge
on Cabinet members are so strong, however, that they "may make even a personal
supporter act as the President's 'natural enemy' when he heads a major depart-
ment." ' The resignation of Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Robert Finch
in May, 1970 provides a contemporary illustration of this old problem. A close
personal friend and long-time political associate of President Nixon, Finch experi-
enced great difficulty in reconciling his intense personal loyalty to the President
with the expectations of the HEW bureaucracy and the demands of its clientele.
His seventeen month tenure as Secretary was marked by his refusal to exploit his
relationship with the President on behalf of his departmental constituency and
that constituency's consequent disenchantment with him. When Finch left the
Cabinet it was to assume a position on the White House staff as a counsellor to the
President that was more compatible with their special relationship.
The Finch case raises the question of the degree to which it is possible for
Cabinet members to be the President's men.20 While no President can tolerate a
Cabinet in which all members regularly choose departmental over presidential in-
terests, it is also true that unquestioning loyalty to the President is equally dysfunc-
tional. What is called for is a Cabinet-presidential relationship that is "at once
highly autonomous and deeply responsive.""7
The unsuitability of the Cabinet as an advisory mechanism does not mean, how-
ever, that the President is not dependent on his department heads for advice. But
u' R. FENNo, THE PRSMNirr's CABINET 131 (1959).
2I Id. at 132.
2 5 D. ThumAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESs 406 (x951).
2 Cf. M. BOrNY, TRm SmRNG'rH OF GoVaNMENr 37-40 (x968).
2 7 1d. at 38. See also T. SORENSEN, DEcISIoN-MAKING IN THR rHaI House 68-70 (1963).
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the advice and political assistance which Cabinet members can provide must come
from them as individual political actors of considerable standing. As the head of a
large bureaucracy with substantial information gathering and evaluating capabilities,
with at least some independent sources of power, the Cabinet member has resources
that are valuable to the President. They can be utilized in various ways. Cabinet
members are usually consulted extensively regarding the development of presidential
policies in their areas of activity. They participate in the development of legislative
proposals for their departments28 and in deliberations that lead to the formulation of
the President's legislative proposals. Frequently Cabinet members serve on inter-
departmental committees and task forces that formulate policies and resolve differences
between agencies. Also, depending on their departments, Cabinet members serve on
either the National Security Council or the newly established Domestic Council?'
There is, then, a substantial amount of unified presidential policy control over
departments and agencies, but it is not achieved through the Cabinet. It arises
through the use of other instruments and through direct relationships between the
President and individual Cabinet members. In this latter regard, the Cabinet official
often acts as a broker between the President and his staff and the bureaucracy and
its clientele. Occasionally a Cabinet member may become a close confidant of the
President on policy matters that range beyond the jurisdiction of his own department.
In such instances, mutual respect and attraction permit the Cabinet member to be
more than a formal adviser. The cases of Attorneys General Robert Kennedy in
his brother's Administration and John Mitchell in the Nixon Administration illustrate
this type of relationship. In all cases, however, a Cabinet member is only as im-
portant as the President wants him to be. The influential men in the Cabinet will
shift depending on presidential preferences and values and external circumstances.
In the final analysis, it is necessary to look at devices below and beyond the
Cabinet to understand fully the dynamics of presidential intelligence for policy
formulation. Cabinet members are major participants in the policy-making process
in their roles as heads of executive departments and by virtue of individual personal
and political resources and not as members of a group of top level advisers. But
the Cabinet member is more than a presidential staff resource or personal adviser. 0
He is the principal political executive in his particular policy arena. In this capacity
he often speaks for the administration. Neustadt's remarks on the role of the Secre-
tary of State are particularly instructive regarding the situation of the Cabinet
member:
The Secretary has work of his own, resources of his own, vistas of his own. He is
in business under his own name and in his name powers are exercised, decisions
28 See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program, supra note 13; Neustadt,
Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, supra note 13.
'9 See the discussion at 554 infra.
30 See Testimony of Richard Neustadt Before the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Stafflng
and Operations, in Tim PREsiDENCY 5ix (A. Wildavsky ed. 1969).
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taken. Therefore he can press his personal authority, his own opinion, his adviser's
role, wherever he sees fit across the whole contemporary reach of foreign relations
.. . his status and the tasks of his Department give him every right to raise his
voice where, when and as he chooses.31
The Cabinet member draws much of his advisory strength from his departmental
responsibilities; yet he cannot devote himself too extensively to running his depart-
ment, else important policy choices will be made with little input from him.
The inefficacy of the Cabinet as a formal advisory mechanism and as a policy-
making body does not obviate the need for collective action at some point in the
process. Differences in perspective and objectives are bound to exist between agencies.
Somewhere, not too far -removed from the President, there must be a means of
identifying alternatives, clarifying goals, and settling upon compatible courses of
action. In short, policy coordination is necessary. Given the phenomena of depart-
mentalism and of social and political pluralism, that coordination can only be
secured through committees or through routinized procedures. It cannot be obtained
by presidential fiat.
Cabinet-level committees for policy-making and policy coordination include those
appointed to deal with a specific subject or problem, such as the Cabinet committees on
economic policy and on environmental quality, and formal policy councils like the
National Security Council (NSC) that are established by law or executive order
and that operate with sizeable staff support. The most widely utilized means of
securing coordination, however, is the interagency committee which generally operates
at the sub-cabinet and agency head level.
Cabinet committees can be an effective means of handling a specific situation or
policy problem. They can focus attention on it quickly and have flexibility in develop-
ing situations. But they are limited by other demands and claims made on their
members. If Cabinet committees are provided with supportive staffs of significant
size they quickly tend to become routinized operations and to lose the sense of
urgency and the flexibility that justified their initial establishment. Cabinet com-
mittees that acquire permanent status tend to lose their high initial visibility and
also their capacity to hold the attention of their members. They become one of many
groups operating in the presidential arena. The committee that President Nixon
established to facilitate school desegregation illustrates the problems encountered by
a continuing Cabinet-level committee. The committee was chaired by the Vice
President and included the Attorney General, the Secretary of HEW, and a number
of subordinate officials. Because desegregation involves unsettled questions of con-
stitutional interpretation and is a highly sensitive issue, the committee has not been
able to develop a uniform national policy. Presidential statements on the subject have
reflected the differing approaches of the Justice Department and HEW. Continuing
controversy has forced the committee into the background.
31 Id. at 522-23.
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B. The National Security Council
An important institutional participant in the presidential advisory system is the
National Security Council, a body which "constitutes the most ambitious effort yet
made to coordinate policy on the Cabinet level."32 Since its establishment the NSC
has been both central and peripheral to the formulation of national security policy.
A review of the uses that Presidents have made of the NSC reveals the alternative ways
of allocating responsibility for policy planning and coordination in this crucial area.
President Truman saw the NSC, which was established by the National Security
Act of 1947, as a necessary facility for study, analysis, and the development of policy
recommendations. Truman did not, however, regard it as a policy-making body.
He was concerned lest the NSC encroach on his constitutional powers and thus
he did not meet with it until the Korean war began. Even with its increased activity
and status after that point, the NSC was no more than a convenient staffing
mechanism with a limited policy-making role.
In sharp contrast, President Eisenhower expanded the NSC into a comprehensive
policy system. He regarded the council as a top level forum for vigorous discussion
of carefully prepared policy papers. These NSC discussions contained statements of
divergent interpretations and approaches and ultimately produced resolutions of the
issues. The NSC was, in Eisenhower's view, a corporate body of advisers rather
than a group of departmental and agency spokesmen. He chaired NSC meetings and
led discussions of papers prepared by the Planning Board, one of the two staff arms
of the Council. The other staff unit, the Operations Coordinating Board, concerned
itself with problems of policy implementation. After a subject had been raised for
NSC consideration by anyone from the President on down in the system, an analysis
would be conducted under the direction of the Planning Board and involving the
agency with the major interest in it. Eventually a policy paper would come before
the council for discussion and action. Once approved, NSC policy actions were sent
to the departments and agencies for execution under the direction of the Operations
Coordinating Board. The process has been described as a "policy hill" with the
NSC at the summit and policies moving up the formulative side through the Planning
Board and down the implementation side through the Operations Coordinating
Board to the departments.33 The NSC also dealt with current policy matters, although
smaller groups of officials usually handled important issues.
President Eisenhower's NSC staff system imposed a comprehensive framework
of order on all aspects of national security affairs. Its defenders argued that it insured
that the President would receive all relevant information and points of view, that it
I" Hammond, The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An
Interpretation and Appraisal, 54 Am. PoL. SOT. REV. 899 (196o). See also Falk, The National Security
Council Under Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, 79 POL. Scl Q. 403 (1964); K. CLtAuM & L. LEGrM,
supra note 7, at chs. 4-5. This discussion draws upon these sources.
" See Cutler, The Development of the National Security Council, 34 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 442 (x956).
See also R. CtrFLER, No TIM FoR RFsr (1966). Cutler was President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs.
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provided a reservoir of policy guidance, and that it afforded rational coordination of
policy formulation and execution. Its critics charged that the system was so ponderous
that it was incapable of responding effectively to emergencies or of developing new
policy departures. It was asserted that the NSC system rigidified an incremental
approach in a policy arena where flexibility was of great value. Furthermore, the
critics claimed, the system purchased consensus at the price of ambiguity. Differ-
ences were said to be papered over with vague policy statements that had no value
as guides to action.
The alleged defects of President Eisenhower's NSC system were highlighted in
a senatorial inquiry conducted by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) during
i96o and I96i." The Jackson subcommittee made a series of proposals that would
have "deinstitutionalized" the system. It recommended that the Council be a smaller
group, limited in membership to top officials and meeting only to advise on critical
issues and problems. The support staffs would be abolished and their functions
reassigned. Finally, the subcommittee suggested that the Secretary of State take
the lead in formulating national security policy and that coordination of policy
implementation be accomplished by an action officer or an informal interdepartmental
committee.
President Kennedy, acting along the lines proposed by the Jackson committee,
proceeded to dismantle most of the Eisenhower NSC system. All that remained was
the statutory council consisting of the President, Vice President, the Secretaries of
State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, and a
small staff headed by McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs. The Council was but one of many ways of solving problems and President
Kennedy consulted its members more often individually than collectively. The
NSC staff became involved in various activities and was a major source of informa-
tion for the President. It worked closely with the bureaucracy, the Bureau of the
Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology. Its principal task was to identify
and manage issues. When it became apparent that the State Department was unable
to assume the major responsibility for initiating and coordinating national security
policy, the NSC staff assumed much of that important role.
The NSC itself was primarily used to consider long term policy problems that
could be dealt with through planning. The NSC staff worked more directly for
the President than for the Council. It concentrated on the action oriented processes
that President Kennedy's approach to foreign affairs required. The Eisenhower
distinction between planning and operations was abolished in favor of a commit-
ment to action with policy serving as the rationale.
The abrupt transition from the Kennedy to the Johnson Administration was
marked by the new President's desire to minimize the shock of the assassination.
"' SuBcomm. ON NATIONAL POLICY lAcHINERY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
86TH CONG., 2d SESS., ORGANIZING POE NATIONAL SECURITY (Comm. Print x960).
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Gradually a distinctive Johnson pattern emerged. It was characterized by the Pres-
ident's reduced dependence on the national security staff in dealing with the
bureaucracy and by increased reliance on the State Department for policy coordina-
tion. The NSC met fairly often, but rarely to consider major current issues. More
important to presidential policy formulation were weekly luncheon meetings, held
on Tuesdays, of the President and selected top officials. These informal gatherings
served as vehicles for making key decisions, receiving advice, and establishing policy
guidance. The informality of the meetings permitted an extensive interchange of
viewpoints and stimulated a flow of information, but they were defective in that
items often arose without advance staff work and no record of decisions was kept.
The Johnson presidency was one in which the President received a heavy flow of
information through personal contacts and written memoranda. His responses, usually
transmitted verbally by the Special Assistant for National Security or the NSC staff,
served as guidelines for the bureaucracy. But there was no mechanism for locating
issues and centralizing their management. The President disposed of most issues on
the basis of memoranda processed by the Special Assistant. Decisions were made after
discussions with a wide range of individuals in and outside of the government.
There was, however, "no predictable pattern to such consultation .... At the end
a decision emerged.""5
In order to reduce the need for the NSC staff to function as an ad hoc inter-
departmental coordinator, President Johnson delegated to the Secretary of State,
in National Security Action Memorandum 341 of March 1966, responsibility for
"over-all direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities."
The vehicles for accomplishing this mission were the Senior Interdepartmental Group
(SIG) headed by the Undersecretary of State and Interdepartmental Regional Groups
(IRG's) headed by assistant secretaries of state. The operational consequences of this
system were not as intended. Whenever the President or the NSC staff assumed
control, as they did with respect to most critical issues, "the existence of the system
was of little significance."3'
President Johnson's approach to national security policy had two distinguished
characteristics-informality and heavy reliance on the NSC staff under the direction
of the Special Assistant. The NSC staff was not actively involved in policy initiation,
however. What it did was act as an intermediary and brokerage agent for the
President, offering advice and providing support when required. The President
retained much direct power over national security matters in his own hands, leaving
largely to chance and his personal resources the formulation of coherent and rationally
interrelated policies.
It is somewhat premature to speak with certainty about the Nixon Administra-
tion's arrangements for managing national security policy. President Nixon appears
"u K. CAtRx & L. LwERE, supra note 7, at 95.
8 81d. at X03.
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to have concluded that a substantial National Security Council staff under the direc-
tion of his Special Assistant, Henry Kissinger, and the reestablishment of the formal
NSC system are both necessary. The Kissinger staff, considerably expanded and
more formalized than its predecessors, plays a major role in coordinating inter-
departmental policy planning. The NSC has been reactivated as "the principal
forum for presidential consideration of foreign policy issues."37 The NSC met 37
times in 1969 and considered over 20 major problems. It operates in a manner similar
to the Eisenhower NSC only without the formal staff units. Initial policy analyses
are prepared by Interdepartmental Groups chaired by an assistant secretary of
state. (These resemble the IRG's of the Johnson Administration.) Then an inter-
agency review group of senior officials, which is chaired by Kissinger, examines the
papers "to insure that the issues, options, and views are presented fully and fairly.""8
Finally, the matter under consideration is presented to the President and the NSC.
Nixon's NSC system seeks to involve all relevant agencies in a process that in-
sures that the President and the Council have all the available pertinent information.
It obtains a measure of flexibility through special interagency groups, such as the
Verification Panel in the area of strategic arms limitation and the Vietnam Special
Studies Group. It makes provision for crisis planning and management through a
special group of high officials, the Washington Special Actions Group.
The Nixon NSC system combines White House and departmentally centered
control of policy formulation through use of both a sizeable NSC staff and inter-
agency groups. It relies on systematic formal procedures but seeks to retain flex-
ibility through special committees. Most significantly, according to the President, it
is built upon a realistic appraisal of the tasks that it faces. 9
C. The Domestic Council
As Wildavsky has observed, there are two presidencies, one concerned with
national security policy, the other with domestic affairs.40 Substantial differences
distinguish the two policy realms. In national security policy, events often move
at a -rapid pace with potentially grave consequences. Very littie that happens can
be dismissed as inconsequential and actions may be irreversible once taken. In
domestic affairs, policy decisions are usually incremental adjustments in previous
courses of action. Major policy changes occur only infrequently and then only
after prolonged pressure and deliberations or in periods of crisis. Most domestic
policy decisions are reversible; if they fail to meet the pragmatic test of results,
something else will be tried. Another difference involves presidential control over
87 Report by President Nixon to the Congress, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 197o's: A New Strategy for
Peace, in 116 CoNG. REc. H927 (daily ed. Feb. I8, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Report by President
Nixon].
s Id.
89 Id. at H928.
"W'ildavsky, The Two Presidencies, TRANs-Ac-roN, December, 1966, at 7. This discussion draws on
Wildavsky's excellent analysis.
PRESIDENTIAL ADvicE AND INFoRmATIoN
policy. As a matter of constitutional and practical necessity Presidents have greater
discretion in national security matters. There are fewer rivals for policy control and
the ability of those rivals to obtain and use information is much less than in domestic
affairs. The range of options and competitors is much broader in the domestic realm
where interest groups and Congress possess greater capacity to bargain with the
President. Wildavsky calculates that in the period 1948-64, positive congressional
responses to presidential initiatives were almost twice as great in national security
matters as in domestic affairs 1
The differences between the two policy realms have resulted in contrasting
staffing patterns. National security policy formulation has transpired with the
benefit of the elaborate intelligence capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the armed services and with the support of the NSC and its staff. There has
been no comparable formalization of structure and process in the domestic arena.
Coordination of policy formulation has been a responsibility of many agents: the
Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Science
and Technology, and more recently, the councils on rural and urban affairs, as
well as devices such as interagency task forces, the concept of a lead agency, and
reliance on individual presidential assistants. There has been an informal and often
unsystematic approach to policy formulation as compared with the national security
policy arena. To the extent that there has been a coordinating force, it has been
provided by the budget bureau. But the Bureau was never intended to function
as a top level policy council that considered proposals for action after careful staffing
had been completed. Rather, it was a staff agency with about 500 career professionals
that cleared legislation drafted in the bureaucracy, analyzed proposals emanating
from the departments, agencies, and other sources, and prepared the budget. All this
was done with a view to maintaining the integrity of the President's overall pro-
gram.
The pattern of domestic policy coordination has varied between administrations.
For example, President Johnson utilized a small staff headed by Joseph A. Califano,
a presidential assistant. President Kennedy assigned responsibility to a group of his
White House staff aides with special assignments to his brother. Under President
Eisenhower, Sherman Adams, acting in the manner of a military chief of staff,
personally directed the process of domestic policy coordination. President Nixon,
after a year in office and on recommendation from his Advisory Council on
Executive Organization, established the Domestic Council through Reorganization
Plan No. 2 of 1970. The Domestic Council is composed of the President, the Vice
President, the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, HEW,
HUD, Interior, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury, and other officials as may be
deemed appropriate on an ad hoc basis. The Council is to have a staff of professional
,lId. at 8.
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experts42 and is headed by a presidential assistant whom the President designates as
its executive director.
At this writing, the Domestic Council is still establishing its procedures and
recruiting its staff. The pattern of its operations is not sufficiently clear to permit
a description, let alone an analysis, to be made. However, the rationale for the
Council and the Administration's expectations for it were made quite explicit in
the House hearings on the reorganization plan4 According to Roy L. Ash, the
chairman of the Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization,44 the major organiza-
tional premise was that presidential staff functions for policy and program formula-
tion should be separated from those for program implementation and administration.
This reaffirmation of the old politics-administration dichotomy,4" which academicians
had thoroughly discredited by the early i95o's,46 rested on the belief that it was
"unsound" to have the same organization perform both functions because different
kinds of information, skills, and attitudes are required for each and because policy
formulation requires a longer time perspective and is less subject to daily pressures
than implementation isY Such a formal separation of functions characterized the
NSC system under President Eisenhower, but it had not previously been employed
in presidential staffing for domestic affairs. Its effectiveness remains to be dem-
onstrated. It does recognize the increased necessity for effective program evaluation
and the complexities of program implementation.
The Ash commission envisioned the Domestic Council as "a way to bring to-
gether under one roof many, but not necessarily all, of the sources for developing
domestic policy."48 It is intended to provide a more effective means than reliance
on interagency task forces and informal contact by the White House staff of bringing
necessary information and opinions to the President and of resolving interagency
disputes. The Domestic Council formalizes previous arrangements which, accord-
ing to the Ash commission, were random and haphazard. The staff will gather
information, analyze issues, and present the Council with opposing lines of reasoning.
" At this writing the staff consists mostly of Republican political activists rather than social scientists
and other specialists.
" Reorganization Plan No. 2, supra note ".
"The council was established on April 5, x969. Mr. Ash, the President of Litton Industries, served
as its only chairman. It has commonly been referred to as the Ash Commission.
" The development of the analytical distinction between politics and administration is attributed to
Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow. See Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197
(1897); F. GooDNow, Poui-cs AND ADMINIMATION (1900). The relationship of the dichotomy to
American administrative scholarship is carefully explored in D. WALDo, THE ADx ,usNaxz-va STATE Ch. 7
(1948).
"See Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in I PUBuc PoLscy
(C. Friedrich ed. 195o); Kingsley, Political Ends and Administrative Means, 5 PuB. AD. RaV. 375 (943);
W. ANDaasort, REsEARcH IN PuBLIC AomINIs-RATON io6 (1945); P. APPLEBY, supra note 2; Long,
Power and Administration, 9 PuB. AD. REV. 257 (1949); Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46
Am. POL. Set. R.V. 8o8 (1952); Long, Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and
Responsibility, x5 Put. An. Rav. 22 (954).
T See the testimony of Roy L. Ash, Reorganization Plan No. 2, supra note I, at 9-to.
SId. at Io.
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The task of the staff will be to make certain that policy alternatives have been fully
presented so that the President and the Council can make informed, rational choices.
It is anticipated that the President and the Council will act with a "common data
base" developed by the staff.4 The Ash commission realized that Presidents will vary
in their utilization of the Domestic Council. Its expectation was, however, that the
Council will prove to be a useful managerial tool that increases the President's control
over policy formulation and reduces somewhat the time required to achieve it.
The establishment of a domestic analogue to the NSC raises several questions.
Although the Domestic Council staff is supposedly to refrain from reconciling any
issues in its analyses, is it realistic to expect that the staff will not have a major
substantive impact on policy? Such an impact can perhaps be minimized if recruit-
ment is on professional grounds. But the pressures to insist on political criteria will
be great if not overpowering. The establishment of a technical career staff comparable
to that of the former Bureau of the Budget seems unlikely. One of the advantages
of the Bureau was its devotion to the needs of the presidency. This was made
possible, at least in part, by its separation from the political pressures of the White
House. The Domestic Council-if it is to be the high-level forum for discussion,
debate, and ultimate policy determination that its creators envision-will operate in
closer proximity to the President. It will necessarily have a highly political staff.
Can this staff provide a continuing institutional memory for domestic affairs?
A second set of questions pertain to the Domestic Council's relationships with
other presidential staff units, with the bureaucracy, and with Congress. At the
reorganization hearings, Representative Chet Holifield (D-Calif.) argued that the
Council would become a barrier between the President and the new Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB). This would downgrade the OMB, Holifield reasoned,
since the policy functions formerly exercised by the budget bureau would be
performed by the Council staff. Furthermore, Holifield feared, that staff will be
unavailable to Congress and yet be able to affect the decisions of the OMB.!0 The
question of congressional-Domestic Council staff relations remains to be determined.
The role of the OMB in policy formulation does appear likely to be substantially
reduced. The 0MB will no longer participate in formulating legislative proposals
and following them through. The useful feedback of program results and knowl-
edge of program defects that enabled the budget bureau's program divisions to help
the bureaucracy develop amendments to existing legislation and to formulate new
legislative proposals will be channeled to a different policy staff. Raymond Saulnier,
who served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) during the
Eisenhower Administration, raised objections at the hearings to the absence of the
Budget Director and the Chairman of the CEA from the Council's statutory mem-
'Id. at 55.
0Id. at 43.
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bership.5' He argued that this would deprive the Domestic Council of the "in-
timate knowledge of budget resources and demands" and the CEA's special com-
petence in economic matters. He recommended that the CEA be assigned re-
sponsibility for staffing Domestic Council agenda items in its area. Whether the
importance of the OBM, CEA, and other staff units will be lessened is an unanswered
question. Their status may be jeopardized by the new arrangement, but it is too
early to make such a judgment.
Finally, it is unclear how the existence of the Domestic Council will affect inter-
agency relations and agency access to the President. The department heads will
undoubtedly have access to him through the Council and also directly as in the past.
But their subordinates will not have these points of contact. Agency heads and sub-
cabinet officers will have to deal with the Council staff on matters involving policy
formulation and with the OMB on matters of budget and policy implementation.
To the extent that the OMB retains its former policy formulation roles, there will
be duplication of effort (with the risk of considerable confusion) and the rationale
for the reorganization will be defeated. There is also a question regarding access
to the White House. In the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations, presidential
assistants served as points of contact for agencies and interest groups and acted as
brokers between the White House, the bureaucracy, Congress, and the attentive
public. For example, Douglass Cater was President Johnson's liaison man for ed-
ucational policy. Even after two years of the Nixon presidency, there is still (in
early 1971) great uncertainty regarding the points of contact. The Domestic Council
may increase rather than reduce the communication gap between the White House
and the bureaucracy, especially below the Cabinet level. The Council and its staff
may isolate the President rather than bring him closer to the operational problems
of domestic politics as intended.
The Domestic Council is, then, a major but uncertain factor in presidential policy
formulation. Ideally it will prove to be an effective staffing arrangement that permits
the administration to arrive at the "best solution after weighing carefully all viable
choices.' 52 On the other hand, it could become a rigidified policy control structure
that impedes initiative, blocks alternatives, stifles originality, and is incapable of
quick, flexible responses. 3 The best guess is that its performance will fall between
these two stools. 4
D. Office of Management and Budget
Since presidential-bureaucratic relations through the instrumentality of the former
"'Id. at 32-34. Supporters of the reorganization plan responded that the Chairman of the CEA and
the Budget Director would be included on the Council at the President's discretion.
" HousE Comms . ON Gov upmdNr OPRA-TiONS, DISAPPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 2 OF 1970,
H.R. REP. No. io66, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970).
'~Id. at 21.
C fI. Carey, Reorganization Plan No. 2: Remarks by William D. Carey, 30 PuB. AD. REv. 631 (1970).
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Bureau of the Budget (BOB) are the subject of another paper in this symposium,55
I will not dwell at length on the role of this major presidential staff unit in policy
formulation. As every student of American government learns in the introductory
course, BOB did far more than prepare the annual presidential budget. It had a
major responsibility for coordinating and safeguarding the integrity of the President's
overall program.56 It had an impact on policy formulation through the preparation
of budget requests for departments and agencies, the clearance of all views expressed
by federal agencies on pending legislation, review and evaluation of legislative
proposals originating in the bureaucracy, and coordination of the process of develop-
ing and preparing presidential legislative proposals. In performing its dudes,
the budget bureau worked closely with the bureaucracy. It developed a professional
expertise of its own based on substantive knowledge acquired over time and com-
mitted to serving the President. In recent years, BOB played a key role in staffing
and organizing the work of presidential advisory groups. Bureau officials served on
advisory committees or their staffs, the Bureau analyzed advisory committee reports
and recommendations, it participated in high-level consideration of those reports, and
it was the mechanism for linking committee proposals and other suggestions for
policy change to the annual budgetary process.
Operating with no constituency other than the President BOB provided objective
staff assistance over time. Its biases were those of professional careerists in public
service. Bureau officials developed a skeptical attitude toward other participants in
the policy process-bureaucrats, congressmen and their staffs, and pressure group
representatives-and they routinely challenged all suggestions and ideas in the
context of their conception of the President's program goals. The Bureau did not,
however, serve as a source of information. It was an institutional screen through which
all kinds of information and advice was filtered and assayed in terms of its value
to the President and his program.
The changes instituted under Reorganization Plan No. 2 will undoubtedly affect
the central role of BOB in policy formulation. The emphasis in the new OMB is
more on management than on policy development. The Domestic Council and its
staff will presumably assume many of the functions formerly performed by BOB.
This shift occurred in the realm of national security policy in 1947. It is too soon to
determine if OMB's domestic policy role will parallel the rather limited one that
it has played with respect to national security matters. Certainly the domestic policy
format will be different. Decisions which Budget Bureau officials and White House
staff members formerly made apart from department heads will presumably be
made in a forum that includes them as principal participants. OMB will be involved
" Schick, The Budget Bureau That Was: Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and Future of a Presidential
Agency, 35 LAw & CoIfroary. PROB. 519 (1970).
10 See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program, supra note 13; Neustadt,
Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, supra note i3; Maas, In Accord with the
Program of the President, in 4 PUBLIC POLICY 79 (1953).
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but as a supportive staff whose major concern is with costs and with implementation.
However well these changes work in practice, it is their clear objective to reduce the
significance of the budget staff in presidential policy formulation and to utilize it
more extensively as a device for coordinating and rationalizing the implementation of
policy. Given the great value of BOB to Presidents since Roosevelt it is, in my
judgment, questionable whether the revision of its mission and the consequent
separation of policy formulation from implementation will "enable the President to
have more facts and better options at his disposal when he makes his decisions."
5'
It is doubtful if structured enforcement of the politics-administration dichotomy will
endure and, if it does survive, whether presidential policy leadership will be en-
hanced rather than weakened. 8
E. The Inner Circle and White House Staff Advisers
The absence of formal institutional support for the President in Congress, the
fragmented parochialism of the bureaucracy, and the lack of an integrating party
structure grounded in an ideology combine to make the task of leadership in policy
formulation one of bargaining and manipulation. As Neustadt has so aptly stated,
"presidential power is the power to persuade."5 In approaching the task of policy
leadership, modern Presidents have depended heavily on the group of friends, coun-
sellors, secretaries, and other aides who constitute the White House Staff and on an
informal inner circle of close associates and confidants. These two sets of advisers
are continuously and directly involved with him in the formulation of policy. They
have some overlapping members and their composition and operational pattern
varies between administrations and over time within a single presidency.
Inner circles, which have also been referred to as "kitchen cabinets," "the in-
visible presidency," and similar terms, tend to be comprised of a few key White House
staff members, one or two Cabinet members who enjoy the special confidence of
the President, and occasionally a few personal friends of the President."0 There is
a tendency to attribute great power to these intimate presidential advisers and they
no doubt have exercised considerable (but indeterminate) influence over recent Pres-
idents. For example, John Foster Dulles and Sherman Adams apparently pre-
dominated over all other advisers to President Eisenhower for the first several years
of his presidency. The intimate personal and intellectual relationship between Pres-
ident Kennedy and his brother Robert is well known. And President Johnson placed
great reliance on two of his Cabinet members, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.
Although interaction between the President and his informal inner circle is a central
feature of policy formulation, it is necessary to guard against overemphasizing this
57 Testimony of Dwight Ink, Assistant Director of the Budget, Reorganization Plan No. 2, supra note
I, at 89.
5 Cf. Carey, Reorganization Plan No. 2: Remarks, supra note 54.
R. NEusrtADT, supra note 7, at 32. See also E. HEaMUNG, PRESIDENTAL LE.DmRsmP 24 (94o).
cj. Seligman, Presidential Leadership: The Inner Circle and Institutionalization, supra note a; L.
KoENIG, Tim INVSBLn PRESENCY (ig6); P. ANDERSON, ThE PRESmENTS' MEN (x968).
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phenomenon. There exists a collective presidential decision-making process that is
not so much the work of a few individuals as the organized effort of many groups
including the inner circle, the White House staff, OMB, and a host of presidential
advisory committees.61 Furthermore, national policy-making may center in the
presidency, but it involves a considerable number of political elites in different policy
areas. These elites, which overlap only occasionally, participate actively with the
presidency in shaping national policy.62
The inner circle provides the President with broad gauge advice on critical policy
choices that is unrestrained by departmental, agency, or pressure group interests.
It is held together by a mutual bond: the President's need for advisers who share
his values and goals but who can broaden his perspective and the advisers' capacity
and desire to meet that need. Membership in the inner circle is prestigious (despite
Brownlow's plea for men with "a passion for anonymity") but it may be short-
lived. The tasks that its members perform are demanding, and the President's needs
and preferences change. According to Seligman, inner circle members function as
"buffers," ".catalysts," "liaison men," "fixers," "needlers," "communications experts,"
"policy advisers," and "sometime ideologists."63 Its members may be selected because
of their ability to perform tasks for which the President is unsuited. In this respect,
the inner circle complements the President's personality. It compensates for his lim-
itations.4
The White House staff, which usually includes some inner circle members, is
larger and more formalized. The President enjoys great freedom in setting up his
office and selecting his staff, but its functions are fairly well established. Its pri-
mary job is to furnish the President with sufficient information and analysis to permit
him to make decisions with an awareness of the available alternatives and their
probable consequences. The specific tasks of the White House staff include press
relations and communications, speechwriting, congressional liaison, pressure group
and general public liaison, management of the President's schedule, and policy
advice and counsel.
The management of press relations and communications is crucial to building
and maintaining a favorable presidential image. The persons who perform these
tasks, however, seldom manage to exert influence on major policy decisions. Their
advice relates to tactical rather than strategic matters. Speech writers are also in-
volved in presidential communications. Their role affords them the opportunity to
exert some influence on substantive policy decisions, but only to the extent that the
President has confidence in the judgment of the individual speech writer. For in-
" Cf. J. BURNS, supra note 2, at 152-53; Seligman, Developments in the Presidency, supra note 2,
at 707.
12 See Thomas, Bureaucratic-Congressional Interaction and the Politics of Education, 2 1. Comp. AD. 52
(1970); Cronin, The Presidency and Education, Pm DELTA KAPPAN, Feb. 1968, at 295.
"' Seligman, Presidential Leadership: The Inner Circle and Institutionalization, supra note 2, at 412-
13.
0, Seligman, Developments in the Presidency, supra note 2, at 710.
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stance, Theodore Sorensen was one of President Kennedy's principal speech writers.
His style, tone, and ideas merged with those of his chief so that they were often
indistinguishable. On the other hand, the identity of President Nixon's wordsmiths is
virtually unknown. They remain anonymous White House artisans who mold
presidential addresses to specifications determined by their superiors.
Presidential liaison with Congress and with pressure groups is a White House
staff function of twofold importance. It shapes the scope and content of input from
Congress and pressure groups to the policy-making process and it affects the level of
support for the President's policy goals. Failure to involve congressional leaders
adequately at a sufficiently early stage can spell the defeat of the President's legisla-
tive program. As a practical political matter, congressional sentiment must be
assessed and congressional leaders consulted in determining the administration's
policy agenda. The operating responsibilities of the congressional liaison staff in-
clude presenting the administration's position on legislation to individual congress-
men, coordinating and directing the administration's legislative program on Capitol
Hill, gathering information, including congressional sentiment, analyzing legisla-
tive issues, assessing the potential impact of presidential statements and actions,
and performing auxiliary services for members of Congress."' Under Presidents
Eisenhower and Nixon congressional liaison has been a line operation somewhat
removed from direct access to the Chief Executive. Their liaison staff directors, Wil-
ton Persons and William Timmons, did not enjoy direct access to them."' The policy
impact of the liaison staff under these circumstances has come from its assessments
of probable congressional opinion and actions. Under Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, congressional liaison occupied a more central position in the White House
staff. With Lawrence O'Brien, a skilled political tactician, directing the lobbying
staff, congressional relations were significantly upgraded, although it took O'Brien
and his team some time to master their work. Both Democratic Presidents worked
directly with O'Brien in shaping the content of their legislative programs as well as
in developing legislative strategy. While all Presidents are dependent on their liaison
staffs to shepherd legislation through Congress, the role of that staff in policy-
making varies substantially.r All presidential lobbyists are agents, salesmen, and
contact men. They can become advisers and counsellors if the President wishes.
Until the Nixon Administration, liaison with politically important interests was
handled by the congressional relations staff and through the practice of assigning
primary responsibility for liaison with groups in specific policy areas to presidential
assistants. Access to the White House was generally channeled through these individ-
ual contact men who acted as brokers between the presidency and the pressure groups.
'5 For an excellent description of President Nixon's congressional liaison operation see Bonafcdc & Glass,
White House Report/Nixon Deals Cautiously with Hostile Congress, NA'rL J., June 27, 1970, at 1353.
" In November, 5970 President Nixon appointed former Congressman Clark McGregor as a counsellor
with responsibility for congressional relations. McGregor's role and relationship to the President is yet
to be established.
" Cf. A. HOLTLMAx, LEGisLATivE LIAIsoN: ExECUTivE LEAD.asmp IN CoNGREss (1970).
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Outside groups knew whom to see if they wished to make a presentation of their
views. The assistants who acted as contacts performed these tasks in addition to their
other duties. They did not formally coordinate information gathering or the rendi-
tion of advice, but were available to groups seeking access. In varying degrees and
ways, they filtered the input to the President from external sources. Presiden Nixon,
in keeping with his preference for formalizing staffing arrangements, assigned re-
sponsibility for contact with organized constituencies to a separate staff."" The out-
side liaison staff acts as a broker between pressure groups and administration policy-
makers. The lodging of this responsibility in a special staff is an attempt to improve
the scope and content of informational input and to more effectively convert the
resources of private interests into support for the President. It has the advantage,
from the presidential perspective, of systematizing what previously was a random
process. Its disadvantages are not yet dear, but one possible difficulty may stem
from the inability of a small liaison staff to develop sufficient familiarity with all
policy sectors to be able to deal selectively and effectively with them. The liaison
staff may simply become a crew of messenger-errand boys with no function other
than to receive and direct communications and to perform special chores such as
organizing meetings and checking out presidential appointments. An outside liaison
staff with no recognized policy impact could become a liability if pressure groups
perceived them as buffers between themselves and the real policy-makers. As with
congressional liaison, the President must rely on the White House staff to manage
relations with organized constituencies. They have great potential value to him
as sources of political leverage but they can also be sources of frustration. Dealing
effectively with pressure groups requires a skill and tact that gives them a sense
of efficacious involvement in policy formulation. The most appropriate approach to
this staff function is not yet apparent.
The management of the President's time is another vital task of the White House
staff. There are two dimensions to this function: the screening, condensation, and
digesting of information that reaches the President and the control of his schedule.
Obviously, time is a most precious presidential resource. No President can read all
the memoranda, reports, newspapers, and other printed matter that he should to be
ideally well-informed. Therefore, he must attempt to minimize the costs of his
ignorance.69 The White House staff performs this task in accordance with pres-
idential reading habits and tastes, but regardless of its directives it necessarily exer-
cises substantial discretion over what the President reads. There is an inescapable
policy impact in this staff function that should be recognized even though it cannot
be controlled.
The staff members who manage the President's schedule perform an ancient
" See Bonafede, Men Behind Nixon/Charles W. Colson: President's Liaison with the Outside World,
NAT'L J., Aug. 8, x97o, at 1689.
"' Cl. Downs, Why the Governmental Budget is Too Small in a Democracy, x2 WORLD POL. 541
(196o); A. DowNs, AN EcoNosMuc THEORY OF DEMoCRACY (957).
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political task, that of doorkeeper. Since the beginnings of organized government
those who guarded the ruler's door have exercised substantial influence and power.
Henry Fairlie describes the White House as "pre-eminently a staff of competing
doorkeepers," and he argues that the medieval office of chamberlain still exists.70 The
President depends on his schedule makers to reserve his time for those persons and
activities which are politically beneficial and to protect him from unnecessary wasting
of time. The policy preferences of the President's doorkeepers can determine who sees
him and thus, to a degree, exerts an influence on his decisions. To minimize
the power potential that inheres in their "chamberlains" Presidents have tended to
select men whose personal loyalty is unquestioned and whose policy interests are
either so limited as to pose no problem or closely identical to those of the President,
such as President Nixon's assistant, H. R. Haldeman.
The members of the White House staff also provide the President with policy
advice and counsel. (Those who particularly "have his ear" become, by definition,
members of the inner circle.) White House staff advisers fall into two general cat-
egories. First, there are the experts and intellectuals whose skills, knowledge, and
experience make them valuable as idea generators and as evaluators of policy
alternatives. Their professional or academic perspectives complement the political
outlook of the President. In the early years of the Nixon Administration, Henry
Kissinger in national security policy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan in domestic affairs,
and Arthur Burns in economic policy furnished this type of advice. The second
basic category of White House advisers includes close political associates and personal
friends of the President. These are truly the President's men whose main value lies
in their ability to perceive an issue or situation in terms of its effect on the President
and his political objectives. Their advice and counsel is political and personal. In
the Nixon administration, John Erlichman, and Robert Finch, after his departure
from HEW, exemplify the close political-personal adviser. Such advice is neces-
sary and essential to a President, but hardly sufficient. It must be combined
with expert and professional advice within the White House and with a wide array
of external advice and information.
White House staff advisers are a mobile and transient group. Their ranks seldom
-hold firm as most Presidents move through several sets of advisers in the course of
their administrations. In part this is due to the expendability of presidential staffers
who not infrequently drop out when policies they have espoused fail or lose favor.
It also stems from changing policy goals and situational factors which alter pres-
idential staffing requirements.
F. Presidential Advisory Committees
The formulation of policy in the presidency and the executive branch also in-
volves extensive utilization of advisory committees. A General Accounting Office
" Fairlie, Thoughts on the Presidency, TnE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1967, at 37.
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survey, conducted in late 1969, revealed the existence of 1,573 boards, committees,
commissions, panels, councils, conferences, task forces, and other advisory groupsrl
The survey identified 198 "presidential committees," that were so designated when
one or more of their members was appointed by the President. These presidential
groups are created by statute, executive order, or less formal directive. Their
manifest task is to advise and make recommendations, but they perform other func-
tions as well. An analysis of the full range and activity of presidential advisory
committees is beyond the scope of this paper. I will limit my discussion to the most
salient aspects of those groups which have played a prominent role in presidential
policy formulation: public commissions, White House task forces, and White House
conferences, all of which operate for a limited time period, and permanent advisory
bodies, such as the CEA and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC),
that are lodged in the Executive Office of the President.
Modern Presidents have used short-term advisory bodies for the study of specific
problems or issues. The end product of these groups is usually a report and a set
of recommendations for action. Public commissions are the most well-known
temporary advisory committees."2 Presidents employ commissions for various
purposes. The establishment of a commission is a safe response to a serious situation
or problem. It dramatizes the President's concern and his desire to obtain expert
information and advice. The unstated presumption is that presidential action will
follow the report and recommendations of the commission. Although the commission
may prove to be an important source of advice, its immediate function is to reassure
the public, ease tensions, and alleviate pressures on the President. The Warren
Commission, the Kerner Commission, and the Scranton Commission performed
this function for Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Their proposals, however, did not
serve as major sources of policy initiatives. Commissions have also been used to study
less salient but persistent problems such as housing (the Kaiser Committee of 1967-
68) and executive organization (the Ash Commission of 1969-7i). These groups,
although less publicized, tend to be more able to perform fact-finding and analytical
activities that will generate viable policy suggestions for the President.
Most commissions, being public bodies, are necessarily broadly representative.
This means that all relevant functional constituencies are included in the member-
ship, a condition that has effects on the work of the commission. On the one hand,
it may lead to a thorough airing in a highly visible forum of the central policy issues
involved. On the other hand, it may result in a blurring of critical differences of
opinion because of pressures to produce a consensual document. In most cases the
representative character of presidential commissions contributes to their failure to
serve as important sources of new ideas. (The i97o report of the Commission on
11 Presidential Advisory Committees, supra note I, at 5.
" See F. PoPPER, TI-E PRESIENT'S CozatatssloNs (1970); Drew, On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Gov-
ernment by Commission, AiA.rrxc, May, 1968, at 45; Bell, Government by Commission, TRE PuBLTC
INtsr, Spring, 1966, at 3-
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Obscenity and Pornography is a notable exception, although its proposals were
publicly rejected by the President.) As one critic of the Kerner Commission ob-
served, its purpose was "not so much to develop innovative solutions as to legitimize
existing untried solutions.""3
Sometimes a presidential commission can prove quite embarrassing to the Chief
Executive. President Johnson chose largely to ignore the Kerner report's sweeping
proposals for new and expanded domestic programs. They were strikingly in-
compatible with a tight federal budget and with the proud claims of accomplishment
for the Great Society. Two years later, in i97o, President Nixon's alleged lack of
leadership was a major finding of the Scranton Commission's report on campus dis-
orders. Although Nixon's response to the report was moderate in tone, other
members of his Administration rushed to attack the report and castigate its authors.
The report of the commission on obscenity and pornography-a group appointed
by President Johnson-received open criticism from Nixon, who used it to inject
an anti-smut dimension into the i97o congressional election campaign.
Because the use of public study commissions entails substantial costs that may
outweigh their potential benefits, Presidents since John F. Kennedy have also sought
information through the employment of other devices such as task forces 4 These
flexible, informal groups have been used to collate a wide range of thinking and
generate new proposals in specific policy areas. Presidents Nixon and Kennedy used
them as vehicles for easing the transition to their administrations. President Johnson
relied upon them as primary sources of ideas for his legislative program. The John-
son task forces were more systematically operated than Kennedy's or Nixon's have
been to date. In all three administrations, however, task force personnel and pro-
cedures have contrasted sharply with public commissions and with permanent ad-
visory councils. A primary rationale for task forces is that they are not confined
by the narrow institutional perspectives of the bureaucracy and Congress or by the
parochial concerns of clientele groups. Rather, they permit the President to call upon
people outside the government with a proper balance between imagination and
practical political considerations for advice in the form of brief appraisals and
tentative suggestions. Task force members tend to be university and foundation
based experts who have some knowledge of and experience with the government.
They are not necessarily representative of all relevant constituencies.
Task forces work with limited staff assistance. Unlike commissions, they do not
produce long, documented analyses. Their reports usually are not published and they
have no official status. The President may keep the task reports confidential or make
all or parts of them public. The ideas contained in them can be accepted or rejected
with limited risk of political embarrassment.
" G. Marx, Report of the National Commission: The Analysis of Disorder or Disorderly Analysis?
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Wasington, D.C.,
1968).
¢" See Thomas & Wolman, supra note 9; Glazer, On Task Forcing, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring,
1969, at 40.
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The limitations of task forces arise from the very informality and flexibility that
constitute their greatest value to the President. They cannot carry as much weight as
more formalized and publicized bodies. Their reports tend to be quite tentative
and speculative and are unlikely to stand alone as the basis for new policies. They
require supportive recommendations and additional studies by other groups in the
bureaucracy and the Executive Office of the President. To the extent that task force
reports are kept secret, as they were in the Johnson Administration, they engender
resentment in the agencies, on Capitol Hill, and in clientele groups. But if the reports
are made public, pressure tends to build for the President to react to the proposals
regardless of how tentative they may be. Task forces also risk becoming routinized if
they are used too extensively. Their success may lead to the destruction of their
informal, flexible character. Task forces are a useful but limited means of obtaining
the experience, information, and ideas from outside the government.
White House conferences have been held on occasion to draw attention to a
specific problem by bringing together a group of distinguished citizens for a public
discussion under presidential auspices. In the past decade conferences have been held
on such subjects as education, civil rights, and international cooperation. The prin-
cipal function of such gatherings is support-building through publicity. White House
conferences have been criticized as explorations of "the lowest common denominators
of their subjects. '75 They have been lauded as manifestations of "meaningful di-
alogue between citizen and government official." 0 In any case, it would seem that
being organized into numerous committees and operating with temporary staff
assistance, the conferences are not likely to be of great value as sources of new ideas
and information. Their principal utility lies, by virtue of their nature, in the base
that they potentially provide among professionals, political leaders, and relevant
constituencies for presidential leadership in meeting the problems at issue. There are
always risks in staging White House conferences. At least some of the notables
who attend are likely to have ideas that are quite at variance with the values and
goals of the President and his administration. These participants may be able to
make the conference move in unintended and embarrassing directions. Another
difficulty that the conferences pose is the generation of expectations that cannot be
met. While a good many participants are not so naive as to regard a conference as
the solution to the problem, the affected sectors of the public and even some par-
ticipants tend to assume that there is a presidential commitment to action. In any
case, although White House conferences can attract and build support and impart
legitimacy to new policy initiatives, they have substantial limitations.
While modern Presidents have had varying success in utilizing temporary advisory
groups, they have generally found two permanent advisory councils with supportive
staffs, CEA and PSAC, to be of substantial value in the formulation of national
" Fairlie, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1966, § VII (Review of Books), at 32, 34.
71 Clemens, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Tha&s, Dec. 18, 1966, § VII (Review of Books), at 15.
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economic and science policies. 7 These two bodies are an integral part of the
Executive Office of the President and thus represent the most extensive formalization
of presidential advisory committees. Both possess independent staffs, but their
structure and operating methods are quite dissimilar. The CEA consists of three
distinguished economists who devote full time to their task and are supported by
a professional staff. The CEA studies economic trends, analyzes macroeconomic
policy alternatives, and examines the economic impact of substantive policy pro-
posals in areas such as housing, welfare, and defense. It furnishes the President with
sophisticated analysis that provides a rationale for presidential decisions and is a
major conduit for funneling new economic ideas to the President. In the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations the CEA often competed with the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Board in shaping economic policy. Under President Johnson the
Council became involved as a major participant in certain policy sectors such as
housing. It moved beyond a purely advisory to a policy-making role. Presidents
Eisenhower and Nixon tended to rely somewhat less on the CEA for basic policy
suggestions and used it more as an analytical resource. The CEA's value to pres-
idential staffing lies in its professional character and in the absence of any formal
ties to a clientele group (other than the academically based American Economic
Association).
The science advisory structure is also highly professionalized, but is somewhat
more complex than the CEA operation. PSAC consists of seventeen persons, most of
them distinguished academicians, and is chaired by the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology. The special assistant, who is the only full-
time member of PSAC, also functions as director of the Office of Science and Tech-
nology (OST) and chairman of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, an
interagency coordinating committee. PSAC conducts much of its business through
panels consisting of one or two of its members plus additional personnel. These
panels examine specific subjects and problems and file reports and recommendations.
OST furnishes staff assistance to the PSAC panels, evaluates scientific research pro-
grams, and assists OMB in the development of science agency budgets. Since the
establishment of OST in 1962, it along with PSAC and the special assistant have
advised Presidents on such topics as the nuclear test ban treaty, the space program,
domestic uses of science, and the development and support of scientific research and
education. The science advisory system is geared to enable a non-scientist President
to make decisions involving the support and use of science that are compatible with
his political, social, and economic goals. In an increasingly complex technological
environment this is an advisory mechanism of great importance. Presidents since
Eisenhower have relied heavily on it to help them shape science policy. According
" For an analysis of the CEA see E. FL.ASH, EcoNoassc ADvicE AND PRESIDENrIAL LEADmsnmP: Ti
CouNCIL OP ECONOMIC ADvismts (1965). The science advisory system is carefully described and analyzed
in M. REAGAN, SCIENCE AN THE FEERAL PATRON (1969).
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to Michael Reagan, the science advisory system has worked to the advantage of both
the scientific and political estates7
Thus far I have not mentioned the myriad of committees and other groups
that advise the President, Cabinet members, and lesser officials. These include two
basic types, interagency committees and public advisory committees. The inter-
agency committee is primarily a coordinating device and is used mainly to monitor
policy and program implementation. Occasionally in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, interagency task forces were assigned responsibility to develop pres-
idential legislative proposals. Interagency groups are apparently necessary to over-
come the structural dispersion of the federal bureaucracy. They have had varying
degrees of success depending, at least in part, on the rank and prestige of the chair-
man. In testimony before the Monagahan subcommittee, William Carey, a long-time
budget bureau official, cited the Federal Interagency Council on Education (FICE)
as an example of an ineffectual group. FICE, which an Assistant Secretary of HEW
chaired, "never did get around to giving advice to the President."7 On the other
hand, Carey observed that the Federal Council on Marine Resources and Engineer-
ing Development, which the Vice President chaired, was highly successful.
Public advisory committees are a pervasive phenomenon in national politics.
They can provide a steady flow of new ideas to the President and members of the
administration and in so doing improve the quality and widen the range of policy
options that are open. They can also serve to broaden the participation of individuals
and groups in the processes of policy formulation thus improving communication
between the government and the public and increasing popular support for various
programs. But advisory committees are subject to limitations if not abuse. Agencies
tend to use them as crutches or shields. Advisory committee members may be coopted
to support narrow bureaucratic rather than broader presidential and public values.
It is also possible that committees may attempt to exercise control over the agencies.
To the extent that they succeed democratic responsibility to the public is blunted.8
The most troublesome problem that advisory committees present the President
is not the lack of information and advice, nor the absence of effective means to
obtain it. Rather, it is the difficulty of organizing and using the advisory system
effectively. What the President does not and cannot know is immeasurable. Most of
the proposals, recommendations, and reports of the numerous committees that are
advisory to him never reach the President. As William Carey told the congressional
subcommittee investigating the matter:
71 M. REAGAN, supra note 77. Reagan believes that the government-science relationship is tenuous
because of the continuing threat that use of the government's financial leverage to direct science to the
achievement of utilitarian goals will destroy the autonomy of basic science. Id. at 317-19.
" Presidential Advisory Committees, supra note I, at 161.
8 For a discussion of policy advisers in the area of education, see Cronin & Thomas, Educational
Policy Advisers and the Great Society, I8 PuBLsc POLICY 659 (1970); Cronin & Thomas, Participant
Perspectives on Federal Advisory Processes, forthcoming in SCIENCE.
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... Government is getting a great deal of advice, and some information, from the
legions of advisory bodies which it creates. I am much less clear on what happens
to the advice, or who is listening. I do know that very little of the advice emanating
from most advisory bodies ever seeps through to the President himself. Most of it is
lost through evaporation, some of it leaks out on staff advisers to the President,
and no one can say with certainty how much of it feeds into policy decisions.
There is no catch basin to filter and synthesize committee advice and recycle it
through the executive branch system.8'
The need for evaluation and analysis of information on a systematic basis has
been long recognized and is at the heart of the rationale for Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1970. There have been some successful ventures in this direction, such as the
CEA and the science advisory system, but they were not comprehensive. The policy
analysis performed by the former Bureau of the Budget, as important and vital to
presidential leadership and planning as it was, did not provide integrative and syn-
thesizing functions at a level of analysis that would solve the problems Carey describes.
Perhaps the new Domestic Council will do so.
Advisory committees of all types are indispensible instruments of presidential
policy leadership. However, they have been used indiscriminately in recent years
with the result that their credibility has been damaged and their potential value
reduced. Furthermore, their findings and recommendations have not always been
systematically analyzed or regularly used as the basis for further policy development.
No doubt Presidents will continue to employ them, but a more realistic appraisal of
their capabilities is in order.
III
TH ADviSORY FuNcTION: A SUMMARY
It has been asserted on more than one occasion, both by former participants in
the work of the presidency and by students of it, that much of what happens escapes
the attention of the President. This is not at all surprising given the complexity
of governmental operations, yet there remains the need for effective presidential
leadership in the making of basic policy decisions. That leadership is heavily de-
pendent on the advice and information that the President receives. To a considerable
extent the President's office and powers are defined in the Constitution and by statute,
he must function as head of one of three equal branches of government, Congress
and established customs have imposed numerous duties upon him, and as the
nation's major political leader he is expected to respond to the demands of partisans
and established constituencies. In meeting the many expectations that surround their
various roles, modern Presidents have found it convenient and necessary to utilize
some basic sources of advice and information that inhere in the institution and the
situation in which they must operate.
"
1Presidential Advisory Committees, supra note x, at 161.
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In this paper I have examined some of the principal advisory mechanisms that
Presidents have employed in the process of policy formulation. The Cabinet and its
committees, the top echelon councils for national security and domestic policy, the
Office of Management and Budget, the White House staff and its inner circle, and
the permanent and temporary presidential advisory committees all carry accompany-
ing benefits and costs. For example, the Cabinet as the symbolic embodiment of the
representative character of the administration appears ideal for building support and
developing consensus when used as a policy-making body. But it is so severely
hampered by the fragmentation inherent in the pluralistic basis of departmentaliza-
tion that frustration often results when Presidents try to use it. Or, when various
types of advisory committees are employed to tap vitally needed external sources of
information, they may prove unmanageable or even embarrassing to the President. Or,
devices designed to provide systematic identification, analysis, and management of
issues and problems, such as the NSC system, may be instituted at the expense of
policy rigidity that limits the capacity for flexible response in emergencies.
The use of many advisory mechanisms-the White House staff and its inner
circle, the OMB, and some type of NSC system-is inescapable and each President
must adapt them to his personal administrative and leadership styles and to his policy
objectives. The use of other mechanisms-the Cabinet and its committees and
presidential advisory committees-is much more discretionary. How Presidents em-
ploy them is likely to vary between administrations according to a rough cost-
benefit calculus that also incorporates elements of style and political goals.
Generally, it appears that Democratic Presidents have tended to prefer a less
formalized, more open advisory system characterized by relatively easy access of
individuals and groups to the President, a heavy flow to the President of reports,
memoranda, and other written material that has only been partially refined or
screened, an absence of strict functional specialization within the system, and a prag-
matic flexibility that is adaptable to emergencies but poorly suited to any kind of
long-range planning. Conversely, Republican Presidents have tended to organize
their advisory systems more formally and elaborately. Their arrangements have
featured greater reliance on the Cabinet as an advisory and decisional body, more
finely prescribed procedures and routines for obtaining and processing information,
more careful management of the President's time through controlled access to him
and highly selective filtration of the flow of paper, an insistence on functional
separation of intelligence tasks, and strong emphasis on long-range planning seem-
ingly at the expense of adaptability to emergency situations. The greater propensity
of most Democratic Presidents to innovate in domestic policy also appears to be
associated with their preference for more open staffing arrangements. The Repub-
lican Presidents' preference for structural formalism and prescribed routines is, how-
ever, at its strongest in the realm of national security policy where there is much less
partisan difference of opinion over policy alternatives. This suggests that the partisan
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factor is an independent determinant of staffing arrangements for presidential policy
formulation.
Regardless of party affiliation, the inclination to develop new policies, and
personal operating style, the President needs substantial assistance in obtaining
and utilizing advice and information. Successful presidential policy leadership
requires that the President's goals be sufficiently well defined that governmental per-
formance can be directed and measured according to the standards that the goals
provide. The refinement of presidential policy preferences is not an easy task, for
the presidency is the strategic focal point of pressures and demands that emanate
from independently powerful elites that function in the numerous policy areas. s2
The President acts as a broker and mediator between these competing and usually
non-overlapping elites. He can provide leadership and direction in those policy
areas that he regards as important, but only if he has secured the needed intelligence.
Unfortunately, there is no specific formula for an effective advisory and informa-
tion system. As President Nixon has so appropriately observed:
There is no textbook prescription for organizing the machinery of policy making,
and no procedural formula for making wise decisions. The policies of this Admin-
istration will be judged on their results, not on how methodically they were made;A
Perhaps the most that can be stipulated is that presidential advice and information
should be as wide ranging as possible and that it should encompass diverse social,
economic, and political perspectives. The advisory system should be structured so
that the President is not isolated, yet he must be protected from fatuous incursions
on his time and energy. At key points close to the President there should be situated
two sets of advisers, one with unquestioning personal loyalty to him and the other
with broader professional and political loyalties. Within these limits, the President
may use whatever combination of advisers and advisory mechanisms he wishes. The
system that he develops will always be characterized by nagging uncertainties as well
as promising potential. Consequently there needs to be continuous analysis and
evalution of the presidency and its intelligence system. Yet the basic pattern is set
and, even with structural shifts such as Reorganization Plan No. 2, is likely to under-
go only marginal adjustments. Ultimately it may well be that muddling through
is the most that we can hope for. If so, the challenge that remains is still demanding:
to manage the muddling so as to produce satisfactory, if not optimal presidential
policy leadership.
" Cf. T. Cronin, The Textbook Presidency and Political Science 34-36 (paper delivered at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, Calif., Sept. 1970).
" Report by President Nixon, supra note 37, at H929.
